Egypt: On demands for the army’s return

[DJKeefy]

Demands for the army to intervene in domestic affairs shows the bankruptcy of opposition currents and the failure of the country's leaders, opening the door for the former regime.

Calls for the army to take over power, which come from “revolutionary” and “civil” forces, reveal the failures of those in power and the bankruptcy of the opposition, and thus require closer inspection.

Army intervention is unlikely because it would gain nothing from being at the forefront of a tense political scene bursting with angry social forces some of which (like the Ultras and several revolutionary groups) detest military rule because of the martyrs killed during its tenure. Also, because the military, at the time, restricted the tide of the revolution or, more accurately, attempted to.

The army knows that being at the helm over the past two years caused it to lose much of its “legendary” immunity and legitimacy that armies are granted after independence. Today, it is in a far better place than if it intervenes; it is beyond criticism, unlike those dominating the political scene; the interests of the institution and senior officers are protected by undemocratic constitutional clauses that limit civilian control of the army and prevent effective oversight of the army’s non-military economic activities and how revenues are distributed; it has a broad mandate in outlining foreign policy; and it wields actual power through the presence of “former” officers in many vital corridors of state.

There are other reasons why army intervention is unlikely, including the dangers of interceding against a president protected by an organisation in revolutionary conditions when taking to the streets is the norm, even for the president’s conservative group. This could result in a domestic war and the complete collapse of what remains of the “Egyptian state.”

It would create a state of chaos that would go beyond key players on the domestic scene, to regional and international players that pose a direct threat to Egypt's economic and security interests.

Calls for the army to return reveal serious problems in the positions of many influential political players. The president’s supporters previously ignored demands for a legislative foundation to guarantee the military institution is under the control of political decisions, while remaining professional and not exceeding its boundaries. They asserted the president had achieved “an unprecedented accomplishment by ending military rule that lasted 60 years,” when he dismissed a handful of military leaders in August. They ignored criticism that this was merely sacrificing a few people to maintain the influence of the military institution, and gave it more powers and immunity from civilian oversight, as seen in the constitution.

Thus, they should reassess these claims since the presidency’s position on the military during recent events reveals the army is not under his control. Meanwhile, his strategy to tighten the control of civilian sovereignty is not as successful as his supporters are claiming, and was based on miscalculations. Also, empowering the military will not stabilise his rule but spread their influence and curb his powers and room for manoeuvre.

Demands by “civil” and “revolutionary” forces for the army to return only weeks after strongly criticising it during debates on the constitution, because of the "special privileges" accorded to the military, and condemning the Muslim Brotherhood-military alliance, implies this criticism was not because of the alliance itself but because these forces were not part of it.

These calls coincide with declarations by some to boycott parliamentary elections as a “moral” not political decision, and should have been justified with an alternative strategy for change. This indicates political bankruptcy and a strategy for change that does not rely on popular revolutionary or democratic political action, or a combination of both. Instead, it relies on undermining the legitimacy of the incumbent regime, not for the benefit of the people or alternative parties, but in favour of the brass.

This is a very critical issue since the bankruptcy of the political scene limits alternatives and allows the reproduction of the Mubarak regime, its institutions and figures. Thus, promises of a “renaissance” by rulers evaporate and “change” is limited to a few figures and not the state’s structures and policies. It also leads to a continued inability to manage the state administration in a manner that meets the minimum needs of citizens.

The regime has failed to achieve key revolutionary goals (retribution, social justice, overhauling security institutions). The opposition limits its agenda to criticising rulers without proposing an alternative on either platform or activism (most of their activities are centred in the capital, in hotels, without any real effort to build alternatives that branch out and are intellectually cohesive). This triggers the people’s cynicism about “change”, which is becoming more costly as time goes by, and further disconnects politicians from the street, because they are preoccupied with issues that are not of interest to the people. All this makes the alternative of “the old state” more appealing for some social strata (especially businessmen and middle-class professionals), and this state would come in the form of the army.

Those calling for the return of the army, if they are genuine “political parties,” are responsible for presenting alternatives to the failure of rulers, and presenting them to the public during elections. They must also continue supporting revolutionary struggle that is searching for usurped rights, not withdraw from all this and ask the military to intervene on their behalf.

Reverting to Mubarak’s regime is not an option because history does not move backwards and because the cornerstone that regime was built on, the culture of fear, has collapsed. Also because what remains of the state’s oppressive power now provokes anger (such as during Al-Itihadiya and Al-Mansoura clashes) or is ridiculed (such as the curfew in Suez Canal cities) rather than frightens.

The acceptance of politicians associated with the revolution to enter and seek alliances with what remains of Mubarak’s regime, and their failure to present policies and solutions for current problems threatens the interests of politicians on all sides, not for security reasons that Mubarak’s regime would return, but from public rage that will devour everything in its path because the legitimacy of “the state” and the entire “political system” has been tarnished for many Egyptians, who will reject all options, including attempts to revert to the past.

Source: http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/66440.aspx

[Chocolate Eclair]

Think you will find that the people will be wanting the Military back soon. I was listening to the radio yesterday and many of the callers to the station fully admitted that Egypt was greater with the Military in charge with Mubarak as the leader, one man was sobbing and delirious demanding that his Country went back to pre revolution days.

[A-Four]

At this stage of the on going troubles in Egypt, I think it is important to keep an eye on the situation in Port Said, but if you live in Egypt, it can be quite difficult to believe what you read and see in the press.

During the bread strikes, before the fall of Mubarack, T.V. and press reported a demonstation in Cairo of 200 people, but in fact the figure was more near 20,000. How do I know this? I was there, and I know what the figure was, and what brutality was used.

[Hafiz]

A-Four - even from the outside its difficult to make sense.

But, it seems a fact that some "elements" have seized small boats and tried to block the canal - that sounds serious. Your advice about Port Said anticipates events.

The chattering classes in the US seem to say that the US continues to oppose a military take-over but is having difficulty with its preferred strategy of getting the Brotherhood to sing Kumbayah with the Salvationists. I don't like the Brotherhood much, but the Salvationists seem barking mad and barking isn't a good tone for singing.

Most Western media seems to have tuned out on Egypt at the moment: not enough gore - they've also gone quiet on Syria - maybe its dipsomania drying out week. The attention span of a crisis journalist is short and their need for gore insatiable. Reminds me of the famous war cry of the foreign correspondent arriving at the 'scene' - 'who here speaks English and has been raped?'.

As far as sobbing for Mubarak - the one thing that dictatorships deliver on is stability, but usually at a very high price. Democracy is always very messy, unstable and often disorganized and its also the worst possible system - until you consider the alternatives. But dictatorships rarely solve the fundamental problems causing instability for example, after 60 years of dictatorship in Egypt, the seculars are still at the throats of the Muslims so dictatorship hasn't solved that problem, only sat on it using force.

If you want a strong man to run things its usually because you are unwilling or unable to do it for yourself and the Salvationists fall into the first category and (I think) the FJP into the second (if the current government gets into real trouble). If the army is the answer then what was the problem?

Once you call in a strong man/the army to stabilize the problem they usually hang around for a very long time and don't even fix the religious/communal threats which justified their takeover. Why would they want to fix the threats which justified their existence? Assad and Sadam Husein and other 'secular' military rulers have been singing from the same song book for decades - "if we go the muslims/christians/sunnis/shias/alawites will kill you all".

Its the same argument the British used in Egypt more commonly known as divide and rule which involved keeping everyone frightened of the other group/religion/region etc and therefore reliant on the colonial power to manage the tension. Stalin had a similar line in managing religious/ethnic/regional tension in the USSR but decades of ruthless rule didn't fix this tension and the 'minorities' sprinted out of the USSR. The former Yugoslavia is another example of the failure of strong man politics to solve underlying religious or ethnic tensions.

Politics in Egypt at the moment, in its inability to take a view of the national interest and failure to compromise on major issues, is probably the result of 6 decades (and the king before that) of never having to accept political responsibility and always yearning for a big man to save the day (Nassr, Sadat, the US, the Army, Saudi/Qatari money and even a resurrected Mubarak) or always avoiding responsibility by looking for someone to blame (the US again, but on the other side of the ledger, the Jews and sometimes even the Copts and in previous decades the Greeks, Armenians and other 'foreign' upper classes). Now the FJP has the Salvationists to blame and visa verse.